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I. Introduction 
Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) are increasingly recognized as being 
extremely important in most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Recent surveys have 
revealed their importance in both urban and rural areas (Meyer, et al., 1994). The MSMEs 
have been largely overlooked, however, in the design and implementation of most special 
credit programs until recent years. Most programs and policies designed to support economic 
activities in the post-colonial period in most SSA countries have been aimed at meeting the 
supposed financial needs of farms, larger industrial firms, and parastatal organizations. The 
economic difficulties faced in many countries have forced a fundamental rethinking of 
development strategies during the 1980s and 1990s, and this has promoted a closer look at 
smaller scale, more informal enterprises. Analysis has shown that they represent a 
surprisingly large share of total production, income generation, and employment creation. 1 
The question that has emerged from this analysis is how policies and programs should 
be redesigned to better serve MSMEs. An obvious conclusion is that the macroeconomic 
environment found in many countries must be revamped to stimulate private sector 
development, and the strong urban and large scale bias of many policies must be reversed. 
But when it comes to identifying how financial services should be improved at a time when 
targeted credit programs have been discredited and many financial institutions are just 
emerging from a decade of ill-advised lending, the recommendations are not so clear. 
Furthermore, there is a significant debate underway about how to develop sustainable fmancial 
institutions to serve the very poor. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize some in-depth research conducted on the 
fmancial system and small scale enterprises in The Gambia. Although the country is small, 
understanding its experience is useful because it is symptomatic of many larger SSA countries 
that are also reforming their formal financial systems. The paper is organized into three main 
sections. The next section summarizes key characteristics of the financial system, highlighting 
the formal banks, a special program for small scale enterprises, and the recent emergence of 
NGOs providing fmancial services. The section following then summarizes the findings of a 
survey of small peri-urban enterprises, and the last section presents a discussion of the major 
lessons learned in this research. 
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II. The Financial System of The Gambia 
The financial system of The Gambia consists of formal banks, specialized credit 
institutions, such as cooperatives and credit unions, and, most recently, nonregulated NGOs 
that supply financial and nonfinancial services to the rural and urban participants in their 
programs. This section will summarize some of the key features of this system that are most 
relevant for MSMEs. 
A. Formal Financial System2 
For most of the past decade, The Gambia has been served by three or four banks. 
Most of their operations have been confined to urban and peri-urban areas. Over time, the 
total number of bank branches has ranged from 12 to 14 , and 9 to 11 of them have been 
located in greater Banjul. There has been considerable instability among newly created banks. 
Table 1 shows the year of opening and closing of banks during this decade. Two of the 
closings are associated with government supply-lending efforts to stimulate the economy 
through increased financial services. The first was the Gambia Commercial and Development 
Bank that just closed in 1992. From its origin, the bank dispensed targeted subsidized credit 
in a manner that compromised its sustainability. It always experienced difficulty in collecting 
loans, and in the end its accumulated arrears forced its closure and the acquisition of its 
performing assets by the Meridien Bank. Political interference encouraged the bank to lend to 
too many risky and/or welfare oriented projects. Donors also contributed to its demise by 
channeling subsidized loans through it for agricultural and small scale industry lending. For a 
time, it was an important lender for the parastatal Produce Marketing Board. 
The second failed government institution was the Agricultural Development Bank 
which had an even shorter life of just seven years. Apparently it was also heavily affected by 
politics and the manager was reported to be one of the largest defaulting borrowers. 
The country began an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985 with the assistance 
of the IMF and the World Bank. It was designed to eliminate some of the major macroeco-
nomic distortions and subsidies that had been introduced into the economy over time. It also 
included liberalization of interest rates and the elimination of targeted and subsidized lending. 
Global credit lines were replaced by indirect monetary control through the use of reserve 
requirements and the issuance of government bonds and T-bills. The latter are sold to banks 
through bi-weekly auctions. 
The impact of these changes is reflected in two ways. First, table 2 reports on credit 
allocation measured in real loans outstanding. The data reveal a steady decline in real loans 
outstanding to most subsectors. Agriculture is one of the subsectors most severely affected. 
Second, as the banks reduced their lending, they increased their nominal reserves and 
holdings ofT -bills (table 3). The ratio of loans to deposits for all banks fell steadily from 
1.43 in 1986 to 0.67 in 1991. These changes are explained in part by the banks' desire to seek 
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safety and relatively high returns. In 1991, for example, the banks could obtain a real interest 
rate of 12-13 percent by investing in government paper. Even though average real lending 
rates were 18-19 percent at the time, this was not sufficient compensation for the banks to take 
the additional risk of lending. 
Although there are no data to clearly show the extent to which MSMEs were affected 
by the changes in the banking system over the last decade, it seems logical to expect that most 
borrowers were large-scale and politically well-connected in order to get and refuse to repay 
subsidized loans. It is not likely that many small and medium sized enterprises would have 
been that successful in getting these formal bank loans. 
B. Special Microenterprise Program 3 
The World Bank initiated an enterprise development project in 1988, but the funds 
were not utilized. Banks were to borrow from a fund deposited in the Central Bank at an 
interest rate of three percent below the T -bill rate and on-lend at the prevailing market interest 
rate (almost 27 percent in 1992). The interest charge to the banks would have been about 15 
to 16 percent at a time when regular time deposits cost only 12 percent, so there was little 
incentive to use the higher cost WB funds. 
This left the Indigenous Business Advisory Service (IBAS) as the only source of train-
ing and formal financial services for small scale firms. IBAS has operated since 197 6 as a 
government program, currently under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Employment. Its 
principal function is to stimulate employment creation through the development of small scale 
enterprises. Services are offered to enterprises that employ five or less employees. In 1992, 
600 members were registered with IBAS. The majority were engaged in manufacturing, retail 
trade and horticultural marketing. Advisory and consulting services, training, and financial 
assistance are included in its programs. Loans are granted for periods ranging between two to 
three years and are generally scheduled for monthly payments. 
IBAS currently administers three loan schemes. The first is funded by the European 
Economic Community (EEC) Fund, the second by the UN Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF), and the third by the government as a Resettlement Program for Retrenched Civil 
Servants. A total of almost 5 million dalasis (close to US $500,000) have been lent to 433 
borrowers since its inception (table 4). Services and manufacturing each represented over 40 
percent of the loans made with agriculture representing 13 percent of the borrowers. The 
average loan size was just under 12,000 dalasis (about U.S. $1,300) for an average term of 27 
months at an average interest rate of 9. 7 percent. Although IBAS has a few up-country 
offices, about 80 percent of the loans were concentrated in the greater Banjul area. 
No new loans have been made in any of the three credit lines since 1988. One of the 
explanations is the high arrears rates in all three programs and an overall arrears rate of 44 
percent. Obviously IBAS is not a sustainable method for providing financial services. It has 
4 
not been able to develop effective procedures for use in lending and in loan recovery. The low 
average interest rate relative to the fairly high inflation rates have made these loans attractive 
enough for borrowers to incur the high transaction costs of obtaining them. But the borrowers 
have not developed enough of a commitment to the program to repay them. Furthermore, an 
analysis of the delinquent portfolio showed that the arrears rate was positively correlated with 
loan size suggesting that borrowers of larger loans may have political support to avoid 
repayment. 
One of the problems in the design of this approach to lending is that IBAS is not a 
financial institution so that the loans were actually handled by the now defunct Gambia 
Commercial and Development Bank. Loan recovery authority did not rest with IBAS. Reforms 
initiated in 1992 were designed to raise interest rates so a larger proportion of costs could be 
recovered, and to give IBAS responsibility for collections. If this reform is accomplished and 
the staff are given sufficient incentives and authority to operate a viable program, it may be 
possible to salvage it. At the time of this study, however, it was a small and expensive 
operation, serving few customers and saddled with a poorly performing portfolio. 
C. NGO Financial Services 
In the early 1990s, there were over 100 international and national NGOs reportedly 
working in The Gambia. Most concentrated in providing a variety of educational and other 
services to the rural and urban poor. As lending from the formal financial institutions 
declined, a number of the NGOs began offering financial services. NGOs represented almost 
18 percent of total agricultural lending in 1991-92. No estimate is available for nonagricultural 
lending. Most of the NGOs with strong links to foreign sources of funds engaged in subsidized 
lending. The national NGOs often had to mobilize their own funds so they offered savings 
services and pursued higher interest rate policies for savings and lending. This difference in 
philosophy about interest rates led to great confusion among borrowers when two programs 
operated side-by-side with widely different terms and conditions. 
NGO loans were granted to individuals and to groups (called kafos). Sometimes NGO 
funds were channelled through traditional kafos, 4 and sometimes the NGO organized kafos 
specifically for this purpose. 
Although there was incomplete information, it appeared that the NGOs were operating 
small scale, highly subsidized lending operations. Frequently the loans made were targeted for 
specific production purposes associated with an economic activity the NGO was trying to 
promote. It appeared that most NGOs were not geared towards becoming self-sufficient 
financial institutions. Their competing models and the associated confusion that emerged, 
however, has led the Central Bank to develop draft regulations to supervise them. 
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III. Micro and Small Scale Enterprises in The Gambia 
The previous section summarized the sources of fmancial services available to 
enterprises. This section reports on a survey conducted of small scale manufacturing firms 
located in the greater Banjul area including the capital city and the surrounding suburbs. It is 
the only area in the country where there is a fairly large concentration of manufacturing firms. 
Four subsectors were included: modern and traditional bakeries, metal workshops, tailoring 
and tie-dye producers. Approximately 40 enterprises were sampled for each subsector. 
The interviews revealed that most of the operators interviewed also owned the 
enterprises which had been in operation for about 10 years on average. They had an average of 
five employees and had about US $15,000 in total physical assets. Just over 70 percent of the 
entrepreneurs were male with an average age of 38 years. Only 14 percent were high school 
graduates and about 60 percent were illiterate. 
Table 5 presents the information obtained for the entrepreneurs interviewed about the 
financial activities of their enterprises. Surveys conducted elsewhere usually report that 
savings, family and friends are the major sources of start-up capital for enterprises. That 
conclusion emerged in this survey as well. Formal loans were important for only the modern 
bakeries. Likewise, only the modern bakeries reported a significant percentage having received 
a formal loan during the past five years. Almost all these bakeries reporting deposits in formal 
institutions while a higher proportion of the other groups of entrepreneurs reporting savings in 
informal groups or with moneykeepers. Retained earnings fmanced current operations for all 
firms and 50 to 85 percent borrowed informally. 
The use of suppliers credits and customer credits or advances varied widely by 
sub sector. Only the bakers reported a significant amount of suppliers credit which tended to be 
accompanied with the purchase of flour. The metal workshops, tailors and tie-dye producers, 
on the other hand, reported a much higher proportion of financing by customers. Since much 
of the production in these three subsectors is for custom designed products, the entrepreneurs 
utilize customer advances as a means to both finance their operations as well as ensuring that 
the ordered products will actually be purchased. The considerable competition amongst 
suppliers of flour also leads to the use of suppliers credit as a part of a marketing strategy to 
increase sales. There appears to be less competition in the supply of inputs used in the other 
subsectors so suppliers credit is not as well established. 
The fact that few formal loans are reported by these entrepreneurs is consistent with the 
situation reported in the previous section about the limited supply of formal loans available in 
the country. Although the results reported in table 5 undoubtedly reflect the preferences of 
entrepreneurs regarding choice of finance, they also reflect the fact that most lenders have not 
been actively seeking ways to lend to small scale fmns. The attractive and safe returns 
available from T -bills discourages banks from trying to lend to risky, small-scale producers 
even though the length of time they have been in business suggests they have reached a certain 
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stability. A significant percent also have deposits in banks. If they maintain their banking 
relationships, perhaps some will be able to eventually convince skeptical bankers of their 
creditworthiness. 
IV. Lessons Learned 
The experience summarized here for The Gambia confirms the findings of research 
conducted elsewhere in developing countries and provides some additional insights into some 
of the problems to be faced in improving the supply of fmancial services for small scale 
enterprises. First, the Gambian experience demonstrates once again the perils of pursuing a 
subsidized supply-leading approach to financial development. The problems are extensively 
documented in several publications including Adams, Aryeetey et al., Deschamps et al., 
Lieberson et al., McKean, Meyer et. al, 1992; Thillairajah, Von Pischke, and Webster. 
In his recent review, Besley found few cases in which market failures provide a 
justification to intervene into rural credit markets. The same case can probably be made for 
most urban credit markets as well. The experience of several financial institutions in such 
diverse locations as in Indonesia (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega; Patten and Rosengard), in 
Bangladesh (Hossain), in Kenya (Mutwa), and in Bolivia (Glosser) shows that under certain 
circumstances it is possible to provide financial services to micro and small scale enterprises 
on a sustainable basis. 
The second general observation is that the banking sector is undergoing reforms at a 
time when the Gambian government needs to finance its deficits. The issuing of T -bills fills its 
need for budget management but provides such an attractive alternative for bank investments 
that there is little interest in developing innovations needed to serve small scale borrowers. It 
is difficult to address this problem without first resolving the governments' fiscal imbalances. 
Third, NGOs are motivated to offer financial services because they perceive that the 
shrinkage of formal finance affects the poor with which they are working. Yet few NGOs have 
yet made the long term commitment required to design and successfully operate a sustainable 
fmancial intermediary. Much more is known today about the requirements for creating viable 
intermediaries. 5 Many NGOs have yet to resolve if they are going to continue to subsidize a 
few fortunate borrowers or develop a sustainable intermediary to benefit large numbers of 
poor enterprises and households. Probably only a few of the current NGOs offering financial 
services will ever make that commitment. 
Finally, enterprise surveys regularly report the important role of trade credit and other 
forms of informal finance for small scale enterprises. 6 For some countries, part of the 
explanation for the large amount of informal finance is repressed and underdeveloped financial 
markets. Informal fmance can expect to fall in relative importance as the formal financial 
system improves. There are aspects of informal finance, however, that reflect true comparative 
advantage. Traders and input suppliers, for example, often have considerable information 
7 
about their customers that is accumulated over time through repeated transactions. This 
information can be used by them to determine which customer should receive credit and how 
much. Furthermore, through interlinked contracts, informal lenders have an advantage in 
collecting loans that is not available to formal lenders. Susu collectors, such as exist in Ghana, 
also accumulate information about their customers which can be useful in loan decisions. 
The large and important role of informal fmance suggest two implications. First, any 
regulatory restrictions on traders on-lending borrowed funds to their customers must be 
carefully reviewed because of their possible negative effect on trade credit. Second, options 
may exist in some countries for formal lenders to specifically agree to on-lend borrowed funds 
to their customers. In some cases, it may be possible for traders to guarantee loans made by 
formal lenders to their customers who they identify as most creditworthy. This three party 
arrangement would tap the traders' knowledge about their customers but not directly involve 
them in making and recovering loans made to small scale enterprises 
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Table 1. Bank Openings and Closings in The Gambia, 1980/88 to 1992/93. 
Banks 
Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) 
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) 
International Bank of Commerce and Industry (BICI) 
General Merchant Financial Institution (GMFI) 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 
International Bank of West Africa (IBWA-BIAO) 
Continental Bank (CB) 
Meridien Bank (MB) 









Note a: The Standard Chartered Bank dates back to the Colonial Period. 











Table 2. Measures of Real Sectoral Commercial Bank Credit in The Gambia, 1981-1991 (Loans 
Outstanding, millions of 1976/77 dalasis). 
Year Agr. Fish. Constr. Trade Tourism Transp. Other Personal 
-- (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 44.15 2.13 9.05 28.97 10.71 4.35 25.51 16.86 
1982 48.10 1.21 8.50 27.12 11.17 5.53 17.13 16.49 
1983 49.15 2.02 6.53 24.24 13.04 5.67 24.38 18.52 
1984 31.07 8.08 8.63 37.15 12.50 6.49 6.43 15.75 
1985 29.89 8.00 11.55 28.36 11.81 4.18 12.92 17.15 
1986 21.54 9.12 12.08 23.25 7.35 3.62 9.58 10.75 
1987 13.59 4.79 7.32 16.30 4.84 4.16 8.26 9.11 
1988 14.27 6.09 6.32 15.39 6.47 4.09 4.94 9.22 
1989 9.03 5.84 5.74 13.61 8.67 2.51 11.23 9.64 
1990 4.48 4.69 3.94 13.66 9.02 0.75 10.71 9.01 
1991 4.89 4.56 2.84 16.86 8.39 0.59 9.01 9.38 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Various Bulletins. 
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Table 3. Liquidity Position of Commercial Banks in The Gambia 1987-1990, (millions of current 
dalasis). 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Liquid Assets (2 + 5) 102.08 150.54 144.61 177.69 193.72 
2. Reserves (3 + 4) 54.63 60.91 41.80 50.75 72.26 
3. Deposits at CBG 49.99 54.47 34.93 41.75 58.43 
4. Cash Holdings 4.64 6.44 6.87 9.00 13.83 
5. T-Bills 47.45 89.63 102.81 126.95 121.46 
6. Required Liquid Assets 73.88 87.69 96.23 103.99 124.15 
7. Reqmred Cash Reserves 33.94 41.17 43.25 48.78 59.08 
8. Excess Cash Reserves (2 - 7) 20.69 19.74 -1.45 1.97 13.18 
9. Excess Liquidity (1 - 6) 28.20 62.85 43.38 73.70 69.57 
Source: Central Bank of the Gambia, Annual Report, 1990/1991, Table VIII. 
Table 4. Characteristics of the Indigenous Business Advisory Service (IBAS) Portfolio by Program 
Funding Source as of June 1991. 
Program 
Item EEC UNCDF Government Total 
Year Started 1986 1985 1987 
No. of Borrowers 121 188 124 433 
Disbursement1 1,017,297 2,797,204 1,140,788 4,955,290 
Amount Due1 1,261,763 3,557,591 1,345,512 6,164,867 
Av. Loan Size1 8,407 14,879 9,200 11,444 
Av. Maturity (months) 23 27 33 27 
A v. Interest Rate (%) 11.6 10.5 6.8 9.7 
Arrears Rate (%) 27.3% 37% 77% 44% 
Source: Information derived from IBAS records. 
Note 1: All amounts are in Dalasis. 
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Table 5. Sources of Financing for Small Scale Enterprises. 
Bakeries 
Metal Tailor Tie-Dye 
Item Modem Traditional Workshops Workshops Producers 
(Percent of Entrepreneurs Reporting) 
Initial Capital 
Savings 15 69.2 92.1 48 55 
Family 7.7 11.5 7.9 34 27.5 
Friends 0 0 0 5.6 2.5 
Formal Loan 77 0 0 2.8 9.5 
Supplier Loan 7.7 19.2 0 0 12.5 
Funds fQr Current Operation~ 
Retained Earnings 100 100 100 100 100 
Informal Loans 54 69 68 50 85 
Formal Loans 59 0 10 39 22 
Supplier Credit 85 81 0 22 27 
Customer Credit/ Advance 0 0 97 92 50 
Formal Loans 
Received a Loan in the Past Five 62 0 0 29.6 17.5 
Years 
Received a Loan in the Past Year 39 0 0 11.4 2.5 
Ever Received a Loan 62 0 16 47 25 
Savings Activities 
Deposit'> in Formal Institutions 90.9 0 16 47 25 
Participating in Informal Groups 0 8 5 44 65 
Saving with Moneykeepers 0 38.5 16 0 7.5 
Source: OSU Enterprise Survey. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Several field surveys conducted by Michigan State University have documented the 
importance of small scale enterprises in several developing countries. In addition, 
recent studies by the GEMINI project of DAI and the World Bank report similar 
fmdings. 
2. This section is drawn from Pollard et al. 
3. This section is drawn from Baydas et al. 
4. Nagaraj an et al. (1994) report an analysis of the operations of kafos in villages and 
raise questions about the wisdom of NGOs utilizing kafos for on-lending because of 
possible negative spillover effects on other kafo functions. 
5. See, for example, the publications by Christen, Rhyne and Vogel; Otero and Rhyne; 
and Rhyne and Rotblatt which discuss the characteristics and approaches of the most 
viable institutions. 
6. See a recent example for Ghana in the paper by Aryeetey et al. 
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